dc.creatorWilson, Bruce M.
dc.creatorRodríguez Cordero, Juan Carlos
dc.creatorHandberg, Roger
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-15T16:32:18Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-19T23:57:31Z
dc.date.available2018-01-15T16:32:18Z
dc.date.available2022-10-19T23:57:31Z
dc.date.created2018-01-15T16:32:18Z
dc.date.issued2004-08-05
dc.identifierhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/the-best-laid-schemes-gang-aft-a-gley-judicial-reform-in-latin-america-evidence-from-costa-rica/D3D74BE61CE00F526A741C38E29BEB4C
dc.identifier0022-216X
dc.identifier1469-767X
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10669/73857
dc.identifier10.1017/S0022216X04007771
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/4526624
dc.description.abstractStarting in the 1980s, and accelerating through the 1990s, international financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and development agencies funnelled considerable resources into judicial reform and rule of law programmes in virtually every Latin American and Caribbean country. The assumption was that reformed court systems would foster free market economic development strategies. This article examines the impact of two frequently advocated aspects of judicial reform, judicial access and judicial independence, on economic policy making in Costa Rica. We argue that there is a potentially significant disjuncture between the sponsors' expectations of the judicial reforms' economic impact and the observed outcomes.
dc.languageen_US
dc.sourceJournal of Latin American Studies, vol.36 (3), pp. 507-531
dc.subjectCosta Rica
dc.subjectReforma Judicial
dc.subjectInstituciones Financieras Internacionales
dc.subjectCorte Suprema de Justicia
dc.subjectSala Constitucional
dc.titleThe Best Laid Schemes ... Gang Aft A-gley: Judicial Reform in Latin America – Evidence from Costa Rica
dc.typeartículo científico


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