dc.creatorAlbornoz, Facundo
dc.creatorCabrales, Antonio
dc.creatorHauk, Esther
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-09T18:23:37Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-15T15:59:58Z
dc.date.available2020-11-09T18:23:37Z
dc.date.available2022-10-15T15:59:58Z
dc.date.created2020-11-09T18:23:37Z
dc.date.issued2019-07
dc.identifierAlbornoz, Facundo; Cabrales, Antonio; Hauk, Esther; Occupational Choice with Endogenous Spillovers; Oxford University Press; Economic Journal; 129; 621; 7-2019; 1953-1970
dc.identifier0013-0133
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/117952
dc.identifierCONICET Digital
dc.identifierCONICET
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/4406168
dc.description.abstractWe study a model that integrates productive and socialising efforts with occupational choice, and endogenous spillovers. We show that more talented individuals work harder and contribute more to externalities, but also have incentives to segregate. Average socialising increases the productivity of the occupation. The size of an occupation grows with its synergies. Individuals underinvest in productive and socialising effort, and sort themselves inefficiently into occupations. We derive the optimal subsidy for sorting into different occupations. Finally, we derive a rule to identify overpopulated sectors and establish the connection between inequality of talents, socialising, productive efforts and occupation size.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://academic.oup.com/ej/article/129/621/1953/5280849
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12634
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.subjectocupaciones
dc.subjectspillovers endógenos
dc.subjectsocializacón
dc.subjectdesigualdad
dc.titleOccupational Choice with Endogenous Spillovers
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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