dc.creatorHernandez Chanto, Allan
dc.creatorFioriti, Andres
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-23T17:47:54Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-15T14:40:06Z
dc.date.available2019-12-23T17:47:54Z
dc.date.available2022-10-15T14:40:06Z
dc.date.created2019-12-23T17:47:54Z
dc.date.issued2019-09
dc.identifierHernandez Chanto, Allan; Fioriti, Andres; Bidding securities in projects with negative externalities; Elsevier Science; European Economic Review; 118; 9-2019; 14-36
dc.identifier0014-2921
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/92797
dc.identifierCONICET Digital
dc.identifierCONICET
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/4397948
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the allocation of an indivisible project in a security-bid auction in which: (i) the allocation of the project to one bidder causes a “negative externality” to his opponents; (ii) the winner has to pay a fixed cost to implement the project; and (iii) the winner’s implementation decision is not contractible. To study the effect of such features on the seller’s expected revenue, we focus on a second-price auction based on one of four securities: (i) cash; (ii) equity; (iii) a fixed-equity hybrid; and (iv) a fixed-cash hybrid. We show that the fixed-equity hybrid generates the highest expected revenue, whereas equity generates the lowest, even though it is the instrument with the highest linkage. Absent negative externalities, equity would generate the highest expected revenue among these four securities. The revenue ranking of the instruments is robust to the information structure and the presence of insurance deposits and entry fees.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherElsevier Science
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292119300807
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.05.003
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.subjectEXTERNALITIES
dc.subjectMORAL HAZARD
dc.subjectSECOND-PRICE AUCTION
dc.subjectSECURITIES
dc.titleBidding securities in projects with negative externalities
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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