dc.creatorBérgolo, Marcelo
dc.creatorCeni, Rodrigo
dc.creatorCruces, Guillermo Antonio
dc.creatorGiaccobasso, Matias
dc.creatorPerez Truglia, Ricardo
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-27T18:40:31Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-15T14:27:30Z
dc.date.available2020-03-27T18:40:31Z
dc.date.available2022-10-15T14:27:30Z
dc.date.created2020-03-27T18:40:31Z
dc.date.issued2018-05
dc.identifierBérgolo, Marcelo; Ceni, Rodrigo; Cruces, Guillermo Antonio; Giaccobasso, Matias; Perez Truglia, Ricardo; Policy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits; American Economic Association; AEA Papers and Proceedings; 108; 5-2018; 83-87
dc.identifier2574-0768
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/101091
dc.identifierCONICET Digital
dc.identifierCONICET
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/4396808
dc.description.abstractFor some entities, such as self-employed individuals reporting income taxes or firms reporting value-added taxes, the optimal evasion rate depends substantially on audit features like audit probabilities and penalty rates (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Whereas it is easy for firms to find other important information such as inflation rates or exchange rates, it is difficult to find information about the probability of being audited and penalty rates. Indeed, Bérgolo et al. (2017) show evidence that firms have large misperceptions about these audit features.1 In this paper, we expand their analysis to explore the sources of these misperceptions.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Association
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181039
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20181039
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectTax Evasion and Avoidance
dc.subjectTax Law
dc.subjectEconomic Development
dc.titlePolicy implications of suboptimal choice: theory and evidence: misperceptions about tax audits
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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