Argentina | info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.creatorBarrio, Eduardo Alejandro
dc.creatorCarnielli, Walter
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-14T20:21:55Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-15T13:42:54Z
dc.date.available2021-01-14T20:21:55Z
dc.date.available2022-10-15T13:42:54Z
dc.date.created2021-01-14T20:21:55Z
dc.date.issued2019-01
dc.identifierBarrio, Eduardo Alejandro; Carnielli, Walter; Volume II: New advances in Logics of Formal Inconsistency; Oxford University Press; Logic Journal of the IGPL (print); 28; 5; 1-2019; 845-850
dc.identifier1367-0751
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/122791
dc.identifierCONICET Digital
dc.identifierCONICET
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/4392689
dc.description.abstractContradictions crop up in an impressive number of real-life contexts of reasoning. On one hand, databases and other formalisms for knowledge representation very often display incomplete information. In many cases, this is remedied by appealing to the so-called closed-world assumption, which means that what is not currently known to be true, is taken to be false. But formalisms for knowledge representation may also contain conflicting (that is, contradictory) information. This may be caused by excessive, incoherent, or vague stipulations. There is, however, no philosophical protection against contradictory information (any analog of the closed-world assumption): standard logic is inflexible against contradictions—the classical logic commandment known as the Principle of Explosion orders that from a contradiction anything should be derived.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzy063
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://academic.oup.com/jigpal/article-abstract/28/5/845/5281240
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.subjectNON-CLASSICAL LOGIC
dc.subjectLFI
dc.subjectPARACONSISTENCY
dc.titleVolume II: New advances in Logics of Formal Inconsistency
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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