dc.creatorLo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-26T19:37:56Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-15T04:38:58Z
dc.date.available2020-02-26T19:37:56Z
dc.date.available2022-10-15T04:38:58Z
dc.date.created2020-02-26T19:37:56Z
dc.date.issued2018-12
dc.identifierLo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco; Some remarks on the MIll-Frege theory of names; Instituto de Filosofía de la Academia Eslovaca de Ciencias; Organon F; 24; 4; 12-2018; 422-455
dc.identifier1335-0668
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/98474
dc.identifierCONICET Digital
dc.identifierCONICET
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/4345838
dc.description.abstractIn a recent paper García-Carpintero (2017) argues that proper names possess, in addition to their standard referential truth conditional content, metalinguistic descriptive senses which take part in semantic presuppositions. The aim of this article is twofold. In the first part I present an argument against García-Carpintero’s presuppositional view, which I call the collapse argument. In short, I argue that the view has the unwelcome consequence of making contexts of use and felicitous contexts of use collapse. If this is correct, a presuppositional account of the metalinguistic descriptions allegedly associated with proper names proves incorrect. In the second part I sketch an alternative Millian strategy which is able to account for the evidence which allegedly supports the presuppositional view.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherInstituto de Filosofía de la Academia Eslovaca de Ciencias
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/organon/?q=sk/some-remarks-mill-frege-theory-names
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectPRAGMATICS
dc.subjectPRESUPPOSITION
dc.subjectPROPER NAMES
dc.subjectSEMANTICS
dc.titleSome remarks on the MIll-Frege theory of names
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución