dc.creatorBraicovich, Rodrigo Sebastián
dc.date2019-09-09T20:17:12Z
dc.date2019-09-09T20:17:12Z
dc.date2012
dc.date2019-09-09T20:17:12Z
dc.date2019-09-09T20:17:12Z
dc.date2012
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-14T19:54:25Z
dc.date.available2022-10-14T19:54:25Z
dc.identifier2037-7177
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/2133/16028
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/2133/16028
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/4290743
dc.descriptionContrary to what has been assumed by several of Epictetus' commentators, I will argue in the present paper that the concept of in Epictetus cannot be reduced to the modern notion of moral conscience, given that the mental phenomenon of (which is closer to the idea of shame than has been assumed by some authors) involves the presence of a transcendent other. The consequences concerning the ethical and theological foundations of Epictetus' thought which derive from this impossibility cannot be neglected if we aim to comprehend the singularity of the author's place in Stoicism.
dc.descriptionFil: Braicovich, Rodrigo Sebastián. Universidad Nacional de Rosario. Instituto de Estudios Críticos en Humanidades. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherBibliopolis
dc.relationhttp://digital.casalini.it
dc.rightsAutor
dc.rightsTodos los derechos reservados por la Editorial
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.subjectStoicism
dc.subjectTheology
dc.subjectAlterity
dc.subjectSolipsism
dc.title¿Epicteto necesita de Zeus? Gratitud, vergüenza y responsabilidad moral en Epicteto
dc.typearticle
dc.typeartículo
dc.typepublishedVersion


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