Custos de transação e colaboração entre agentes públicos e setor privado sob a ótica das construtoras no Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida em municípios paulistas

Abstract

There are a variety of studies discussing the issue of production costs in the housing construction sector. However, as a product that usually envolves coletive interests, there are a set of stages of approvals with the public sector that should be considered as costs. As an example, longer approval periods caused by public sector may interfere in the internal rate of return (IRR) of the project (which may render them unfeasible), exposing a typical situation that generates transaction cost for the operation. As a result, this thesis proposes to dimension the main triggers of transaction costs present in the flow of approvals of construction companies' projects with the public bureaucracy, under the perspective of construction companies. The attributes of the transaction costs proposed by Oliver Williamson were adopted as a theoretical framework: the asset specificity, uncertainty (via the concepts of adverse selection and moral hazard) and frequency. Due to its social function and importance regarding the use of public resources, it was opted for the analysis of these attributes in the project approval relationships for the Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida (PMCMV, 1 - FAR). The research is also completed with some elements of the collaborative production chain methodology for verify how jointly articulated are the actions of the government and private sector in these ventures. The project approval process was mapped to create a research that would cross each step of the approval process with each attribute of the transaction, in such a way to dimension them and identify the most critical points and their causes. It was observed - within the adopted methodology, for the observed aspects and in the evaluated enterprises - that the MCMV stimulated some articulation and coordination of actions from different state spheres (municipalities, state and Union), as well as promoting collaboration between municipalities and construction companies in favor of a common goal. From the point of view of transaction costs, the financial agent (intermediary between the FAR and construction companies) came to assume the greatest relevance due to the moral hazard associated with delays in the transfer of resources to the construction companies.