Rational theory revision in logic: beyond abductivism

Abstract

A recent trend in the philosophy of logic, under the title of “anti-exceptionalism”, proposes that the epistemology of logic should be approximated to that of science: logical theories are not justified by a priori intuitions, but rather, as in the other sciences, by a posteriori (or empirical) evidence. How exactly the relation of logic and science is to be fleshed out by the anti-exceptionalist remains to be determined. An approach favored by many is to adopt “the abductive method” to select the best logical theory. This approach is not without its problems, or so it is argued herein. Anti-exceptionalism should not stand or fall on the merits of logical abductivism, or those of any method of theory revision in particular. Rather than defining antiexceptionalism in terms of applying the scientific methodology of theory revision to logic, the present thesis proposes to define it simply in terms of rational theory revision. Such definition allows for divergent ontological and methodological views to fall under the scope of anti-exceptionalism. The present dissertation articulates what rational theory revision of logic looks like beyond logical abductivism.