dc.contributorClementino, Marco Bruno Miranda
dc.contributorClementino, Marco Bruno Miranda
dc.contributorElali, André de Souza Dantas
dc.contributorSilveira Neto, Otacilio dos Santos
dc.creatorCavalcante, Joyce Oliveira
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-23T17:34:14Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-06T13:40:09Z
dc.date.available2022-09-23T17:34:14Z
dc.date.available2022-10-06T13:40:09Z
dc.date.created2022-09-23T17:34:14Z
dc.date.issued2022-07-21
dc.identifierCAVALCANTE, Joyce Oliveira. A caça ao cervo da tributação: a eficiência do procedimento da Lei de Execução Fiscal à luz da teoria dos jogos. Orientador: Marco Bruno Miranda Clementino. 2022. 78f. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (Graduação em Direito) - Departamento de Direito, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, Natal, 2022.
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.ufrn.br/handle/123456789/49410
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3971838
dc.description.abstractThe present research is a literature review and makes use of the deductive method. Its objective is to analyze the efficiency of the tax enforcement procedure when it is modeled as a game. To achieve this goal it was initially necessary to present the procedure of tax enforcement law, expose the statistics related to its time and cost of processing, as well as, what would be an efficient tax execution for the purposes of this research. With the help of this standard, it was found that the actions related to that law do not achieve efficiency, as they extend over a long period, on average they cost more than they collect, nor do they bring effectiveness to the sentence that judges them. Considering that the origin of most debts is tax, it was necessary to understand the causes of tax default in Brazil. For this purpose, Game Theory tools proved to be ideal, given that this theory provides the language to describe decision-making processes in conflict situations, such as the interactions between Tax Authorities and taxpayers. After the presentation of the tools to model a game, the procedure was transformed into the “tax enforcement game”. Based on this model, it was possible to discuss whether the inefficiency found concerned only the procedure. The tax enforcement game proved to be purely adversarial and fraught with incidental actions, however its biggest problem is the citation stage, that is, it fails before it even starts. The tax origin of most active debts, it was essential to explore the factors that lead to tax noncompliance. Subsequently, the conclusion obtained was that the regulation of tax enforcement law has some problems that can be corrected, but the high failure rate of this type of process comes from more complex factors, such as the complexity of the tax system, the low state return and cultural factors of the country. At the end, strategies applicable to cooperative games were suggested to increase efficiency.
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte
dc.publisherBrasil
dc.publisherUFRN
dc.publisherDireito
dc.publisherDepartamento de Direito
dc.subjectExecução Fiscal
dc.subjectEficiência
dc.subjectTeoria dos Jogos
dc.subjectTax enforcement
dc.subjectEfficiency
dc.subjectGame Theory
dc.titleA caça ao cervo da tributação: a eficiência do procedimento da Lei de Execução Fiscal à luz da teoria dos jogos
dc.typebachelorThesis


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