Remuneração de executivos e persistência do desempenho econômico-financeiro: um estudo no mercado acionário brasileiro

Abstract

Studies on business executives’ compensation have been the focus of much discussion in academia and in the market. This research seeks to analyze whether executive compensation influences the performance persistence of the companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA. To achieve this objective, an econometric model was used with the variables - operating profit, fixed compensation, bonus, profit sharing, share-based payment, size, leverage and social responsibility level - for a sample of one hundred and four open companies, in the period from 2011 to 2015, whose information are available in the Bloomberg database. As a statistical tool, a dynamic panel approach was used by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate the system Generalized Moments of Time (GMM-SYS) method. The results show that only the governmental control companies did not present persistent results. Regarding the compensation, it was observed that the fixed compensation contributes to increase the performance persistence on institutional, family and diffuse controlled companies. In addition, it was found, in all types of control, the non-significance of the payment of bonuses, despite the relevant coefficients. On the other hand, profit sharing had a positive outcome with operating profit in the previous year in government-owned companies. The stock-based payment influences the generation profit in a more persistent way only when the control is diffuse, differing from the findings of Baber, Kang and Kumar (1998) and Ashley and Yang (2004), in which there was no significant variable change. It was also observed that variables such as size and leverage contributes to increase the persistence of profits, while social responsibility contributes to their reduction.