doctoralThesis
Racionalidade filosófica, racionalidade científica e os limites da tradição analítica: uma contribuição à teoria das tradições de pesquisa racional de Alasdair MacIntyre
Fecha
2017-04-27Registro en:
BATISTA NETO, Alberto Leopoldo. Racionalidade filosófica, racionalidade científica e os limites da tradição analítica: uma contribuição à teoria das tradições de pesquisa racional de Alasdair MacIntyre. 2017. 308f. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia) - Centro de Ciências Humanas, Letras e Artes, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, Natal, 2017.
Autor
Batista Neto, Alberto Leopoldo
Resumen
Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory of the traditions of rational enquiry elaborates a
metaphilosophical perspective from which one may evaluate the relative merits of rival
frameworks of rationality in a way that resembles some canonical approaches in the
philosophy of science, but in such a way as to avoid as much as possible the problems
relating to the understanding of theoretic progress as the restrictions proper to relativist
and perspectivist positions, so that it allows, on the one hand, a clear sight of the
conditionings which operate on an investigation and, on the other, to assume a strictly
realist posture anchored in a conception of truth as adequation of mind to reality. It
approximates to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition and, in its mature version, finds in
this tradition its own model and takes itself to be its heir. It is committed to a conception
of rationality specifically adapted, it is argued, to philosophical practice, being an
important task to draw a distinction, ignored by MacIntyre, between a philosophical and
a scientific rationality, the latter dedicated to the building of exploratory models
adequate to the prediction and control of phenomena and the former occupied in judging
of the nature and structure of reality as such. By considering the historical origin of this
parting of ways and approaching the manner in which some philosophers of an
Aristotelian-Thomistic orientation dealt with the relation between natural science and
the philosophy of nature, the primacy is established of a philosophical perspective that
does not simply take scientific rationality as its model, in order to furnish a fuller
grounding to a theory of rational enquiry in MacIntyrean moulds. This complementation
of MacIntyre’s theory of the traditions of rational enquiry, in its turn, allows for an
elaboration of a criticism of analytic philosophy which finds in the adoption of scientific
rationality as a model to philosophical rationality the element apt to confer the
movement the unitary identity of a tradition. Such an identity should not be understood
as adhesion to determinate theses or methodological patterns but rather as an operational
presupposition, and it sheds light on MacIntyre’s sparse criticisms of that tradition,
pointing toward the existence, in it, of a kind of generalized philosophical emotivism.