| dc.description.abstract | The present research aims to approach the theory of institutional dialogues from the perspective of coalition presidentialism. Afterwards the academic internalization of the theory of institutional dialogues, it is necessary to verify the position of the Federal Supreme Court in this national mesh, given the countrys centrality of the coalition presidentialism. In this sense, it is verified that the combination of elements such as multi-partyism, proportional electoral system, federalism, bicameralism, among others, required the building of political coalitions as an artifice that would lead to stability and, consequently, governability. Verifying the legal decision based on this characteristic of the Brazilian institutional draft, it is verified that Judiciary acts as an enabler of the governability, in a clear tendency of deference to the presidential political agendas. We, therefore, adhere to the current critique of the current model of coalitions, aiming to demonstrate that the Federal Supreme Court probates a problematic system of political alliances, adopting a consequentialist criterion that leads to a normative decoupling of the juridical decision and deflates the constitutional and democratic achievements. | |
