dc.contributorErnesto Perini Frizzera da Mota Santos.
dc.contributorhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/2351082986169976
dc.creatorMaylson Gonçalves Candeira
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-04T00:46:05Z
dc.date.available2022-10-04T00:46:05Z
dc.date.issued2020-02-06
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/1843/34718
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3836418
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation analyzes the conceptual step from individual intentional action to collective intentional action. The primary agent of an individual action is only one agent who acts according to his or her desires, beliefs and intentions. In order to analyze individual action, we will take Davidson’s theory of action (2001), according to it a mere bodily movement becomes an intentional individual action only when it is justified, rationalized and caused by an agent’s mental events. However, Davidson does not take an intention as a distinctive mental event and reduces it to the primary reason, which is constituted by a pro-attitude (desire) and a belief. We will make a critical analysis about Davidson’s theory of action taking Bratman’s planning theory of intention. For Bratman an intention is a distinctive mental event that plays fundamental roles in the configuration and elaboration of action plans that extend through time and it is irreducible to desire and belief. Bratman’s theory of action will be taken as an extension of Davidson’s theory. This extension will be fundamental for relating the planning theory of intention in individual action with Bratman’s theory of shared intention in joint action. We will make critical analyses about nonreducionists theories of shared intention such as Gilbert’s (1987) and Searle’s (1992). Thus, we conclude that shared intention is a psychological phenomenon that is socially manifested and that is better explained in terms of individual attitudes of the agents who constitute the group of a joint action.
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Minas Gerais
dc.publisherBrasil
dc.publisherFAF - DEPARTAMENTO DE FILOSOFIA
dc.publisherPrograma de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
dc.publisherUFMG
dc.rightsAcesso Restrito
dc.subjectTeoria da ação
dc.subjectAção individual intencional
dc.subjectAção conjunta intencional
dc.titleDa ação individual à ação conjunta
dc.typeDissertação


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