| dc.description.abstract | The present work is dedicated to the philosophy of law, and specifically intends to contribute to the development of a so-called hermeneutic philosophy of law. Philosophical Hermeneutics, as presented in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and his interpreters, reveals the historical character of man's relation to the world. In this sense, the structural trait that pass through the most basic behaviors of everyday life, to the most complex scientific theory, is historical and comprehensive - to exist is to place oneself in the midst of the fields of meaning, constructs or images that form within the tradition and gradually they settle down in time. Effectual History, an essential component of philosophical Hermeneutics, marks the constant transmission of sedimented senses in the past to the present, the preconceptions or prejudices that allow understanding as a position before the hermeneutical thing. To interpret means, therefore, to open the space so that the thing in question, gestated in the hermeneutical horizon of exit, be received in the hermeneutical horizon of arrival and guide the interpretation. In this way, the interpretable guides the interpretation, in the phenomenological relation that is established between both. A hermeneutically considered philosophy of law aims to take into account the hermeneutic element acting within the processes of constitution of juridicity. When the philosophy of law, then, questions the being of law and justice, in the historical recovery of both, it does not only carry out historiography, as it allows the reconfiguration of the legal institutes, which they acquire in the fusion of horizons between tradition and interpretation. We take as paradigmatic for a hermeneutic philosophy of law the movement of formation of legal normativity beyond the modern image of law completely enclosed in the law, as the source par excellence of juridicity. Our purpose is to allow, in the historical reconstruction of the field of formation of this image, the articulation of diverse voices of normativity, which no longer rely on the basis of the abstraction of the legal position to be constituted. | |
