dc.contributorGilson de Paulo Moreira Iannini
dc.contributorhttp://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4796464P8&tokenCaptchar=03AOLTBLSAEBD6hyAEQC7KqKiElO6DKiPdRve1BMvOKC3PMchrHSfx1BiQrfJHz9scXD5K1RcsLisFYmDLbmQA8NNgvkfWlpgr49B0YOkg04L-cFmy5TbaaE-6PFzqagdFfnMqMLVIyjNxC04M591DNI8p6NnyKL-siWKPtHDg5SoGvfWVH_bUBVjQMjTar9O-n_lAGTOq7AJNVfg1ClL5GPzVHxsCZR7V8fMJs3ZXWCt8txERq3rRFbsqZnVGj8wFn4K3Bm51fxG4iRII73S29sYWXvebZF1jlR29VfVMDHJwnClH2VLuZh_VRzDbV_AwibdRzV2HBmwbmLT-KAfospZWYe0ki_CJuzI8mmXTFMsTUGyhxs1y0htvJz_xcxk79niR6OYB1BX_GUFQJPph5KdtvF8Su_BJvATRcJD0Tl8ZxpQeQS5m62m6zGdGMxHesfqq26_A9l8DigXX2vT9r9tbBHc5ZHuDoLxGyKrAC_YEHQ5Pu47zX6uVtog0igiP1sGwmFY8lrE76P9PtyN79ujA3XYULkmLChMBgNAqn2oumxGzPAlxzq3QaEejE9ud3B2ucl9AFHnq
dc.creatorLoren Alyne Costa
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-27T12:08:22Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-03T23:43:47Z
dc.date.available2019-11-27T12:08:22Z
dc.date.available2022-10-03T23:43:47Z
dc.date.created2019-11-27T12:08:22Z
dc.date.issued2019-08-14
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/1843/31291
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3827167
dc.description.abstractThe question of the scientificity of psychoanalysis presupposes the notion of determinism, that is, to determine the laws governing such an object, it is necessary to find a linearity between cause and effect. If in classical physics and determinism, for example, we need to know the first cause to determine the later effects, when it comes to the subject this presupposition presents a failure. This is because when investigating the unconscious and its laws of determination, we have only the effects, its formations as the dream, the parapraxis, jokes, repetitions and screen-memory. These effects, instead of leading to a direct path to the first cause, to the primordial trauma and to the etiology of the neuroses, rather promote a certain “falsification” of truth, so that we have only the contours of the cause. Thus, at every moment Freud intends, through the natural sciences, to weave a linear explanation of the unconscious from its effects, he encounters obstacle points that prevent a causal explanation from being made. If the repetition of the symptom is what demonstrates that there is something fixed, that there is a certain structure, how to have access to this invariant if from the unconscious we have only its fictional and contingent fragments? How can the subject repeat in the future an experience of the past? What logic and what temporality is at stake on this path from cause to unconscious effect? Having such questions to the horizon, we start from the hypothesis that if we can speak of determinism in relation to the unconscious, a certain temporal twist is necessary since it is not possible a linearity between cause and effect when it comes to the subject. Because it is in an evanescent state between two signifiers, the cause is what always appears as interval, making something of the past to remain unrealized, to come in the future. In this sense, it is the Nachträglich, in its very specific dimension of a posteriori that is not of the order of a delay, but of a temporal dimension rather topological than linear.
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Minas Gerais
dc.publisherBrasil
dc.publisherPrograma de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia
dc.publisherUFMG
dc.rightsAcesso Aberto
dc.subjectinconsciente
dc.subjectdeterminismo
dc.subjecttrauma
dc.subjectverdade
dc.subjectficção
dc.subjectNachträglich
dc.subjectliteratura
dc.titleO inconsciente é um passado que não se realizou : o percurso topológico inconsciente do determinismo ao Nachträglich.
dc.typeTese


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