dc.contributorFelipe Nunes dos Santos
dc.contributorhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/9841599355693033
dc.contributorCarlos Ranulfo Felix de Melo
dc.contributorSabino José Fortes Fleury
dc.contributorBruno Pinheiro Wanderley Reis
dc.creatorCaio Túlio Guimarães de Souza
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-08T15:08:34Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-03T22:54:42Z
dc.date.available2019-11-08T15:08:34Z
dc.date.available2022-10-03T22:54:42Z
dc.date.created2019-11-08T15:08:34Z
dc.date.issued2019-06-28
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/1843/30895
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3813144
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation aims at revisiting a research problem already treated by brasilian and brasilianist academic literature, but yet without a consensus: are the individual amendments to the budget used as bargaining tools to buy the supportof the legislators by the Executive? We benefit from the novelty of the Amendments Impositive Budget (which constitutionalised the mandatory budgetary and financial execution of the individual amendaments), from the related availability of public and beliveable data sets with individualized data of amendaments execution, and from the theoretical and methodological accumulation to carefully investigate the question that guide us. The time span analised comprehends the 25 months between june 2016 and june 2018, wich cover almost entirely Michel Temer’s government. We use control variables not only for the safe of the inference produced about the key explanatory variable, but also to test correlated hypothesis, like the ones that suggest that legislators with geographically concentrated constituency or with intermediary ideological distance from the government are more likely to take part in the bargain with amendments. The descriptive analysis and the estatistical models suggest that pork may not be the main explanation for the high support rates obtained by Temer. In addition, and in a perplexing manner, we verify a intertemporal dynamic between the variables that disrupt entirely with what has been verified in previous works: pork has negative effect over support on the first two months and has positive effect only on the second month after the payment, and this effect is narrow, much smaller than the one of the traditional coalition goods. This findings brings relevant contributions to some of the questions and hypothesis used to explain the Executive-Legislative Relations in brazilian multiparty (“coalitional”) presidentialism and keep some others form diferente research fields clamoring for attention.
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Minas Gerais
dc.publisherBrasil
dc.publisherFAF - DEPARTAMENTO DE CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA
dc.publisherPrograma de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política
dc.publisherUFMG
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/pt/
dc.rightsAcesso Aberto
dc.subjectPresidencialismo de coalizão
dc.subjectRelações Executivo-Legislativo
dc.subjectEmendas individuais
dc.titleRelações executivo-legislativo no presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro: emendas individuais como ferramenta de barganha no governo Temer
dc.typeDissertação


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