Dissertação de Mestrado
Índice de risco de expropriação de acionistas minoritários: uma análise com os níveis diferenciados de governança corporativa e risco idiossincrático
Fecha
2018-03-26Autor
Mirian Mara Batista da Silva
Institución
Resumen
This research, descriptive and qualitative and quantitative approaches, aims to create a risk index of expropriation of minority shareholders of companies listed on the BM & FBovespa, from 2010 to 2016. In addition, the validation step of this index allows the study of the relationship. The subject of expropriation of minority shareholders with Corporate Governance, closely related by the base purpose of governance of mitigation of agency conflicts and also, the impact of the risk of expropriation on idiosyncratic risk. We sampled 192 companies from different sectors, corresponding to 54.70% of the total companies listed in the Quantum database. A Factorial Analysis was used for the grouping as the variables that resulted in four indexes. Each index was classified as growing and separated into quartiles, with the first quartile being concentrated as companies that had the highest risk of expropriation in exchange for the fourth quartile, where the companies with the highest risks were suspended. It was concluded from this questionnaire that the suggested indexes represent the risk of minority expropriation, since cases consistent with the phenomenon studied for most of the indicated institutions were exposed. In addition to the qualitative analysis, there was a contract between the minority members of lower risk of expropriation of minority shareholders and the awards of the "Best Companies for Shareholders" award. There is no classification of risk of expropriation, which the indexes propose besides the IINT (intangibility index), are validated by companies as companies in many levels of risk. Media Test of Mann- Whitney has shown that corporate governance best practices are the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders. Finally, using the generalized least squares method, we conclude that the power indices of controllers and loans to controllers have a positive influence on the idiosyncratic risk