dc.creatorTúlio Roberto Xavier de Aguiar
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-15T14:19:52Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-03T22:38:16Z
dc.date.available2021-10-15T14:19:52Z
dc.date.available2022-10-03T22:38:16Z
dc.date.created2021-10-15T14:19:52Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.20911/21769389v45n141p89/2018
dc.identifier2176-9389
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/1843/38375
dc.identifierhttps://orcid.org/ 0000-0003-1991-5406
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3807131
dc.description.abstractIn this article, I examine the counterfactual theory of causation of David Lewis, showing its dual aspect as analysis of the concept of causation and as research of what causation really is. I compare the Lewisian theory with Hume's theory of causation, emphasizing the different role natural laws play in each system and argue that the counterfactual theory is more sensitive to capture the varied degrees of contingency of causal relationships.
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Minas Gerais
dc.publisherBrasil
dc.publisherFAF - DEPARTAMENTO DE FILOSOFIA
dc.publisherUFMG
dc.relationSíntese - Revista de Filosofia
dc.rightsAcesso Aberto
dc.subjectMundos possíveis
dc.subjectSuperveniência
dc.subjectGraus de contingência
dc.subjectDavid Lewis
dc.subjectDavid Hume
dc.titleCausalidade, contrafactuais e leis
dc.typeArtigo de Periódico


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