dc.creatorPico A.A.
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-26T16:32:50Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-28T20:12:19Z
dc.date.available2020-03-26T16:32:50Z
dc.date.available2022-09-28T20:12:19Z
dc.date.created2020-03-26T16:32:50Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifierCuadernos de Economia (Colombia); Vol. 33, Núm. 63; pp. 359-379
dc.identifier0121-4772
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12585/9049
dc.identifierUniversidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
dc.identifierRepositorio UTB
dc.identifier56427739200
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3722531
dc.description.abstractAmartya Sen argues that his notion of justice has its origins in the thinking of Adam Smith. Sen employed, in a very particular way, the concepts of sympathy and the impartial spectator. Beyond the statement of Sen, we are interested in researching whether Smith's notion of justice is compatible with Sen's. The main finding is that there are significant differences between the theories and therefore they are not compatible. Smith emphasized the importance of moral judgment based on sentiment. Conversely Amartya Sen emphasizes the need to use reason and public debate as key elements of a theory of justice.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
dc.sourcehttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84912031922&partnerID=40&md5=2a50512cf39fe722983b4a56202492cb
dc.titleMoral sentiment and reason: The notion of justice in Adam Smith and Amartya Sen


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