Control del poder público, sistemas de selección de magistrados e independencia judicial: caso Corte Constitucional

Abstract

This work tries to solve the following legal problem: What is the incidence from the legal and institutional point of view of the selection system for the magistrates of the Constitutional Court provided for in the Colombian Constitution in the exercise of their functions and in the Principle of Judicial Independence? This analysis will be developed in three thematic axes: In the first, the most relevant characteristics of the Theory of Brakes and Counterweights and the Principle of Separation of Powers in the constitutional order are studied. The second deals with the concept of judicial independence and its implications for the exercise of the functions of the magistrates of the Constitutional Court. In the third, the influence of the current model for the selection of magistrates of the Constitutional Court against the legal and institutional scope of judicial independence is analyzed. Therefore, the research method used is deductive and for the development of the topic different and numerous doctrines were consulted, both national and foreign, among others. As a result, it was found: The constitutional power conferred on the legislative body and the executive body to participate in the selection process for the magistrates of the Constitutional Court. These powers provided in the legal system to other State institutions, are represented in a faculty that provides superiority of the latter over the former. Consequently, it can seriously affect the principle of separation of powers and, as an effect, it jeopardizes the independence of the judges of the Constitutional Court. Therefore, it is considered pertinent to propose an election model that is not restricted to minimum requirements and incorporates designation mechanisms that meet the meritocratic principle.