Métodos Bayesianos para caracterizar el comportamiento legislativo del Senado colombiano en el periodo 2010 - 2014

dc.contributorSosa Martinez, Juan Camilo
dc.contributorUniversidad Santo Tomás
dc.creatorLuque Zabala, Carolina Maria
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-22T17:13:55Z
dc.date.available2021-09-22T17:13:55Z
dc.date.created2021-09-22T17:13:55Z
dc.date.issued2021-09-16
dc.identifierLuque, C. (2021). Métodos Bayesianos para caracterizar el comportamiento legislativo del Senado colombiano en el periodo 2010–2014 (Tesis de maestría). Universidad Santo Tomás, Bogotá, Colombia.
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11634/35664
dc.identifierreponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad Santo Tomás
dc.identifierinstname:Universidad Santo Tomás
dc.identifierrepourl:https://repository.usta.edu.co
dc.description.abstractThis work applies Bayesian methodologies to characterize the legislative behavior of the Colombian Senate during the 2010–2014 period. The analysis is done through the plenary roll-call votes of this legislative chamber. Furthermore, parliamentary electoral behavior is operationalized by implementing the one-dimensional standard Bayesian ideal point estimator by means of Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithms. The results mainly provide contributions in two directions: Political space dimensionality and pivotal legislators identification. Patterns revealed by the estimated ideal points suggest non–ideological latent trait (opposition–no opposition) underlying the vote of the Senate deputies. Thus, in addition to providing empirical evidence for a better understanding of legislative policy in Colombia during the period under analysis, this work also offers methodological, theoretical, and practical tools to guide the pre-processing and analysis of roll-call data in contexts of unbalanced parliaments (as opposed to the North American parliament), taking as a reference the particular case of the Colombian’s Senate.
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad Santo Tomás
dc.publisherMaestría Estadística Aplicada
dc.publisherFacultad de Estadística
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dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
dc.titleMétodos Bayesianos para caracterizar el comportamiento legislativo del Senado colombiano en el periodo 2010 - 2014


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