Das flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social world

dc.contributorMoreno Ortiz, Juan Carlos
dc.contributorhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-4759-4398
dc.contributorhttps://scholar.google.es/citations?user=CAsvIusAAAAJ&hl=es
dc.contributorhttp://scienti.colciencias.gov.co:8081/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000250171
dc.contributorhttps://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0000774758
dc.creatorFonseca Martínez, Miguel Antonio
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-16T18:43:40Z
dc.date.available2020-01-16T18:43:40Z
dc.date.created2020-01-16T18:43:40Z
dc.date.issued2020-01-16
dc.identifierFonseca Martínez, M. A. (2020). Das flussbett making rankimg theory useful for the social world. (Tesis doctoral). Universidad Santo Tomás. Bogotá, Colombia
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11634/20569
dc.identifierreponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad Santo Tomás
dc.identifierinstname:Universidad Santo Tomás
dc.identifierrepourl:https://repository.usta.edu.co
dc.description.abstractEpistemology is, at first glance, a specific field on the realm of sciences. Nevertheless, at the same time, epistemology is a general theory of what humans are doing right or wrong in all sciences. Actually, epistemology is about what are we doing right or wrong rationally in all those different fields of science. In this sense, it is a field devoted to achieving knowledge following certain rational justified principles and models. The key question is thus: why ought to follow such principles and models? And, given this, how to establish better, clear, precise and justified models of reasoning to fulfill this normativity task and challenge? The present dissertation is thus devoted to answering such questions in the realm of social sciences. The main goal is to establish an ideal model, a methodological tool-box, for the internal or epistemic normativity of the social sciences thanks to this normative reflection. Following the legacy of Wolfgang Spohn (2011), the dissertation wants to study the epistemic normativity of the social sciences, as a central criterion of its identity and demarcation. The epistemic normativity that subjects follow to the precise understanding of social phenomena, is the core of this specific kind of scientific knowledge, and goes beyond the account of empirical methodologies that appeal to an external normativity that is not exclusive used to the treatment of objects and problems relative to the social sciences.
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad Santo Tomás
dc.publisherDoctorado en Filosofía
dc.publisherFacultad de Filosofía y Letras
dc.relationAlchourron, C., Gärdenfors, P. & Makinson, D. (1985). On the Logic of Theory Change. Journal of Symbolic Logic. 50 (N°2), pp 510- 530.
dc.relationAristotle. (2016). “Metaphysics”, Translated with Introduction and notes by C.D.C. Reeve, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
dc.relationBeebee, H. (2006). Hume on Causation. London: Routledge.
dc.relationBenekewitz, W. (2016). Intentionale Einstellungen, Bedeutung und Modalitäten, in: Freitag, W, Rott, H, Sturm H, Zinke, A. (2016), Von Rang und Namen. Philosophical Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn (pp 15-46). Münster: Mentis Verlag.
dc.relationBlair, A. (2012). Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Selected Papers of J. Anthony Blair. Dordrecht: Springer.
dc.relationBloor, D., (1997). Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions. London: Routledge.
dc.relationBlumson, B. (2012). Mental Maps, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85: 413-434.
dc.relationBrandom, R. (1994). Making it Explicit: Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
dc.relationBringsjord, S. & Sundar, N.G. (2018). Artificial Intelligence, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/artificial-intelligence/>.
dc.relationBrown, T. (1822). Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect. Andover: Mark Newman.
dc.relationCairnes, J. (1888). The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Roberts.
dc.relationCarnap, R. (1934). “Logische Syntax der Sprache”, translated by A. Smeaton as The Logical Syntax of Language, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner &amp; Co.
dc.relationCarnap, R. (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
dc.relationCarnap, R. (1942). Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
dc.relationCartwright, N. (1979). Causal Laws and Effective Strategies, Noûs, 13(4): pp. 419–437.
dc.relationCartwright, N. (2014). Causal Inference, in: Cartwright, N and Montuschi, E. Philosophy of Social Science: A new Introduction (pp. 308-327). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
dc.relationChant, S. & Ernst, Z. (2008). “Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action”, Mind V 117, 467, 549-573.
dc.relationChristiano, T. (2018). Democracy, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/democracy/>
dc.relationChurchland, P. (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67-90.
dc.relationCopernicus, N (1992). “On the Revolutions”, trans. E. Rosen, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (originally published as volume 2 of Nicholas Copernicus: Complete Works, Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1978).
dc.relationCreath, R. (2017). Logical Empiricism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = &lt;https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/logical-empiricism/&gt;.
dc.relationCrupi, V. (2016). Confirmation, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/confirmation/>.
dc.relationDavidson, D (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60. pp. 685-700.
dc.relationDavidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
dc.relationDavidson, D. (1989). The Myth of the Subjective, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
dc.relationDennett, D. (1978). Brainstorms, Cambridge: MIT Press.
dc.relationDennett, D. (1987). The Intentional Stance, Cambridge: MIT Press.
dc.relationDennett, D. (1991). Real Patterns, Journal of Philosophy, 87: 27-51.
dc.relationDescartes, R. (1641). Meditationes de prima philosophia, in qua Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demonstrantur. Paris: Michel Soly.
dc.relationDilthey, W. (1883), “Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften”, Leipzig: Douven, I. and Schupbach, J. (2017). “Formal Epistemology”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
dc.relationDretske, F. (1988). Explaining Behavior, Cambridge: MIT Press.
dc.relationEemeren, F. H. van & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
dc.relationEngel, P. (2011). Epistemic Norms, in: Bernecker, S. and Pritchard, D. The Routlege Companion to Epistemology (pp. 47–58), New York: Routledge.
dc.relationFerber, J. (1999), Multi-Agent System: An Introduction to Distributed Artificial Intelligence, Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman.
dc.relationFodor, J. (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture, Cognition, 28 (N°1), pp.3–71.
dc.relationFodor, J. (1991). You Can Fool Some People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal; Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanations, Mind, 100 (N°1), pp.19–34.
dc.relationFonseca, M. (2009). The Quest for the Numbers, An Approach to Frege´s Philosophy, Logos, (N°16), pp.19–34.
dc.relationFonseca, M. (2012). Verdad de Paralaje, Análisis, (N°81), pp.51–60.
dc.relationFrege, Gottlob SJ [1882]. Uber die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Begriffsschrift ¨ (On the Scientific Justification of a Conceptual Notation). Zeitschrift f¨ur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 81, 29–32. Translation by T. W. Bynum in Frege 1972, 83–9.
dc.relationGamut. L.T.F, (2010). Lógica, Lenguaje y Significado, Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario.
dc.relationGoldman, A. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
dc.relationGoldszmidt, M. & Pearl, J. (1996). Qualitative Probabilities for default reasoning, belief, revision and causal modelling, Artificial Intelligence, 84: 57-112.
dc.relationGoodman, N. (1954). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
dc.relationGrice, H. P. (1957). Meaning, Philosophical Review 66, 377-388.
dc.relationHaas, G. (2016). Epistemic Accesability as a New Criterion of Significance, in: Freitag, W, Rott, H, Sturm H, Zinke, A. (2016), Von Rang und Namen. Philosophical Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn (pp 127-146), Münster: Mentis Verlag.
dc.relationHabermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action, Volumes 1 and 2. Boston: Beacon Press.
dc.relationHalpern, J & Pearl, J. (2005). Causes and Explanations: A structural model Approach, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56, 843-887.
dc.relationHanna, R. (2017). Kant’s Theory of Judgment, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = &lt;https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/kant-judgment/&gt;.
dc.relationHart, Herbert L.A. (1961), The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
dc.relationHedstrom, P. & Swedbeg, R. (1998).Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
dc.relationHempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays, New York: The Free Press.
dc.relationHempel, C. G. (1961/62), Rational Action, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 35, 5- 23.
dc.relationHendricks, V.F. & Pritchard, D. (eds.) (2006). New Waves in Epistemology. Aldershot: Ashgate.
dc.relationHitchcock, C. (2018). Probabilistic Causation, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = &lt;https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/causation-probabilistic/&gt;
dc.relationHuber, F. (2016). Means-End Philosophy, in: Freitag, W, Rott, H, Sturm H, Zinke, A. (2016), Von Rang und Namen. Philosophical Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn (pp 173-198), Münster: Mentis Verlag.
dc.relationHuber, F. (2012). The Laws of Belief Philosophy of Science, Vol 79, N 4 (October 2012), pp, 584-588. Chigago: Chicago Journals.
dc.relationHuber, F. (2016), Formal Representations of Belief, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/formal-belief/>.
dc.relationHume, D. (1748). An Enquiry into Human Understanding, Tom L. Beauchamp edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
dc.relationJeffrey, R.C. (1965). The Logic of Decision, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
dc.relationKant, I. (1787). “Critique of Pure Reason”, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1997).
dc.relationKinkaid, H. (2009). Causation in the Social Sciences, in: Beebee, H., Hitchcock, C., and Menzies P., The Oxford Handbook of Causation (pp.131–157), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
dc.relationKripke, S. (1972). Naming and Necessity, Semantics of Natural Language, G. Harman &amp; D. Davidson (eds.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 253–355.
dc.relationKupffen, M. (2016). Two Theories of Supposition, in: Freitag, W, Rott, H, Sturm H, Zinke, A. (2016), Von Rang und Namen. Philosophical Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn (pp 221-242), Münster: Mentis Verlag
dc.relationKvanvig, J. (2010). “Epistemic Justification”, in: Pritchard, D and Bernecker, S. (2010), “Routledge Companion to Epistemology”, New York: Routledge.pp 25-37.
dc.relationLevesque, H. (2013). Reasoning about continuous uncertainty in the situation calculus, in Proc. of the IJCAI-13 Conference, Beijing, 2013.
dc.relationLewis, D (1973). Causation, Journal of Philosophy, 70, pp.556-567.
dc.relationLewis, D. (2000). Causation as influence, Journal of Philosophy, 97, pp.182-197.
dc.relationLewis, D. (1969), Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
dc.relationLewis, D. (1986), On the Plurality of Wolds, Oxford: Blackwell.
dc.relationLobachevsky, N. (1829/1837). “On the Principles of Geometry”, in: Geometrie imaginaire. Journal fur die reine und angewandte Mathematik, 17:295–320, 1837.
dc.relationMackie, J. L. (1974). The cement of Universe, Oxford: Clerendon Press.
dc.relationMenzies, P. (2017). Counterfactual Theories of Causation, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = &lt;https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/causation-counterfactual/&gt;
dc.relationMill, J.S. (1843). The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, edited by John M. Robson, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, (1963).
dc.relationMill, J.S. (1911/2009). Collected Works: Vol. I, London: Routledge.
dc.relationMiller, S. (2014). Social Institutions, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/social-institutions/>.
dc.relationMoretti, L. & Piazza, T. (2013). Transmission of Justification and Warrant, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/transmission-justification-warrant/>.
dc.relationMüller, T. (2016). Sleaping Beauty in Branching Time, in: Freitag, W, Rott, H, Sturm H, Zinke, A. (2016), Von Rang und Namen. Philosophical Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn (pp 307-326), Münster: Mentis Verlag.
dc.relationNagel, E. (1961). The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Explanation, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
dc.relationNicod, J. (1930). Foundations of Geometry and Induction, New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co.
dc.relationNida-Rümelin, J. (2016). Rationale Kooperation: Die Strukturelle Interpretation, in: Freitag, W, Rott, H, Sturm H, Zinke, A. (2016), Von Rang und Namen. Philosophical Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn (pp 327-338), Münster: Mentis Verlag.
dc.relationOppy, G. & Dowe, D. The Turing Test, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/turing-test/>
dc.relationPapineau, D. (2002). Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
dc.relationPietroski, P., & R. Rey. (1995). When Other Things aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 46: 81–110.
dc.relationPlato. (2014). Theaetetus. Translated by John Mcdowell, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
dc.relationPsillos, S. (2009). “Regularity Theories of Causation”, in: Beebee, H., Hitchcock, C., and Menzies P., The Oxford Handbook of Causation (pp.131–157), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
dc.relationPutnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of Meaning, in: Putnam, H. Philosophical Papers II: Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
dc.relationPutnam, H. (1983). Realism and Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
dc.relationQuine, W. (1960). Word and Object, Cambridge: MIT Press.
dc.relationQuine, W. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review, 60: 20–43.
dc.relationRabin, S. (2015). Nicolaus Copernicus, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/copernicus/>.
dc.relationRamsey, F. (1928). “Further Remarks to Truth and Probability”, in: Ramsy, F., Foundations of Mathematics and other Essays (pp.199–211), London: Oxford.Kegan and Paul.
dc.relationReichenbach, H. (1925). The Causal Structure of the World and the Difference between Past and Future, in: Reichenbach, M. and Cohen, R.S. (eds.), Hans Reichenbach: Selected Writings, 1909–1953, Vol. II (pp. 81–119), Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 1978,
dc.relationReid, T. (1788/2010). Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Haakonssen, K. and Harris, J.A. (eds.), University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
dc.relationRisjord, M. (2014). Philosophy of Social Science: A contemporary Introduction, New York: Routledge.
dc.relationRisjord, M. (2016). Normativity and Naturalism in the Philosophy of the Social Science, New York: Routledge.
dc.relationRussell, B. (2017). A Priori Justification and Knowledge, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = &lt;https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/apriori/&gt;.
dc.relationRyle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson. Schlosser, Markus, "Agency", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/agency/>
dc.relationSchurz, G., Reutlinger, A., and Hüttemann, A. (2015). Ceteris Paribus Laws, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/ceteris-paribus/>.
dc.relationSchwitzgebel, E. (2011). Knowing your own Beliefs, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35: 41-62.
dc.relationSchwitzgebel, E. (2015). Belief, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/belief/>.
dc.relationSearle, J. (1999). The Construction of Social Reality, New York: The Free Press.
dc.relationSellars, W. (1963), Science, Perception and Reality, Austin: Ridgeview Publishing.
dc.relationSkovgaard-Olsen, N. (2014). Making Ranking Theory useful for Psychology of Reasoning (First Dissertation, Philosophy), Konstanz: KOPS.
dc.relationSpohn, W. (1988). “Ordinal Conditional Functions. A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States”, in: W.L. Harper, B. Skrims. Dieks et al (eds.), “Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics”, Vol II, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp 105-134.
dc.relationSpohn, W. (2006). Causation: An Alternative, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57, 93-119.
dc.relationSpohn, W. (2008). Two-Dimensional Truth, Studia Philosophica Estonica, 1(2): 200-213.
dc.relationSpohn, W. (2011). “Normativity is the Key to the Difference between the Human and the Natural Sciences”, in: D. Dieks et al (eds.), “Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation”, Dordrecht: Springer, pp 241-251.
dc.relationSpohn, W. (2012). The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
dc.relationSpohn, W. (2014). The Epistemic Account of Ceteris Paribus Conditions, European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 4: 385-408.
dc.relationSteup, M. (2014). Epistemology, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/epistemology/>.
dc.relationSuppes, P. (1970). A Probabilistic Theory of Causality, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
dc.relationTuomela, R. (2002). The Philosophy of Social Practices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
dc.relationTuring, A. (1950). Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Mind, LIX (N°236): pp. 433–460.
dc.relationStegmüller, W. (1989). Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Stuttgart
dc.relationWalton, D., Reed, C. and Macagno F. (2008). Argumentation Schemes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
dc.relationWeisberg, J. (2016). Formal Epistemology, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/formal-epistemology/>.
dc.relationWeisberg, J. (2016). Formal Epistemology, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/formal-epistemology/>.
dc.relationWittgenstein, L. (1951). On Certainty, New York: Harper.
dc.relationYoung, J. O. (2018). The Coherence Theory of Truth, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = &lt;https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/truth-coherence/&gt;.
dc.relationZahle, J. (2016). Methodological Holism in the Social Sciences, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/holism-social/>.
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/
dc.rightsAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
dc.titleDas flussbett making ranking theory useful for the social world
dc.typedoctoral thesis


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución