Sacrifice Ratios and Inflation Targeting: The Role of Credibility

dc.creatorDe Roux, Nicolás
dc.creatorHofstetter, Marc
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-28T17:15:39Z
dc.date.available2020-07-28T17:15:39Z
dc.date.created2020-07-28T17:15:39Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier1657-5334
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/1992/41017
dc.identifier1657-7191
dc.identifierinstname:Universidad de los Andes
dc.identifierreponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
dc.identifierrepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/
dc.description.abstractTwo recent papers (Gonçalves and Carvalho, 2009; and Brito, 2010) hold contradictory views regarding the role of inflation targeting during periods of disinflation. The first paper claims that inflation targeting reduces sacrifice ratios¿i.e., the ratio of output losses to the change in trend inflation¿during disinflations; the second paper refutes this result. We show here that inflation targeting only matters if disinflations are slow. The credibility gains of a fast disinflation make inflation targeting irrelevant for reducing the output-inflation trade-off.
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
dc.relationDocumentos CEDE No. 03 Febrero de 2012
dc.relationhttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/009325.html
dc.rightsAl consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.titleSacrifice Ratios and Inflation Targeting: The Role of Credibility
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo


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