Oligopsony and Minimum Wages

dc.creatorVallejo, Hernán
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-26T14:28:21Z
dc.date.available2021-03-26T14:28:21Z
dc.date.created2021-03-26T14:28:21Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/1992/49603
dc.identifier1657-7191
dc.identifierinstname:Universidad de los Andes
dc.identifierreponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
dc.identifierrepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/
dc.description.abstractThis article presents a model of oligopsony. It considers different conjectural variations that cover the whole range between the extreme cases of monopsony and perfect competition, such as Collusion, Threat, Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand, and compares them in terms of prices, quantities, profits, mark-down, price elasticity of supply and welfare. It also considers the impact of minimum wages, under the different conjectures analyzed.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
dc.relationDocumentos CEDE No. 13 Marzo de 2021
dc.relationhttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/019140.html
dc.rightsAl consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.titleOligopsony and Minimum Wages
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo


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