The Role of Debt in the Family Business Succession Problem

dc.creatorGonzález Ferrero, Maximiliano
dc.creatorMisle, Bernardo
dc.creatorPrado, Jorge
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-21T15:19:00Z
dc.date.available2020-09-21T15:19:00Z
dc.date.created2020-09-21T15:19:00Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier1900-1606
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/1992/46376
dc.identifierinstname:Universidad de los Andes
dc.identifierreponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
dc.identifierrepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the typical succession problem in family businesses with respect to the hiring or not a professional manager once the founder decides to retire. Burkart et al. (2003) show how a legal framework is an important determinant in solving this problem. We extend their model in order to consider the possibility that the founder uses bank debt to alleviate monitoring cost. We find that bank debt plays also an important role in family businesses succession problem and gives an alternative explanation of why family firms in emerging market countries are mostly financed through the banking system and do not float their own shares in the capital markets.
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad de los Andes
dc.publisherFacultad de Administración
dc.relationGaleras de Administración, No. 22
dc.rightsAl consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad de los Andes
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
dc.titleThe Role of Debt in the Family Business Succession Problem
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo


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