dc.date.accessioned2020-04-15T14:37:48Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-23T18:08:08Z
dc.date.available2020-04-15T14:37:48Z
dc.date.available2022-09-23T18:08:08Z
dc.date.created2020-04-15T14:37:48Z
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1142/S1793993319500054
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/8789
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1142/S1793993319500054
dc.identifierinstname:Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
dc.identifierreponame:Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3495983
dc.description.abstractIn order to suggest an appropriate regulatory regime in the context of firm asymmetry, this study has developed a mathematical model that allows to elucidate comparisons of three different regulatory scenarios. In the unregulated market, the low-cost firm is more likely to become dominant in the market. Symmetric regulation has an immediate effect on off-net prices, which fall to the level of its marginal costs. Finally, asymmetric regulation is a highly effective way of promoting market entry. Asymmetric regulation can generate higher social welfare.
dc.publisherUniversidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightsAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.subjectAsymmetric networks
dc.subjectCargos de acceso
dc.titleAsymmetric networks and access charges


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