dc.date.accessioned | 2020-04-15T14:37:48Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-09-23T18:08:08Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-04-15T14:37:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-09-23T18:08:08Z | |
dc.date.created | 2020-04-15T14:37:48Z | |
dc.identifier | https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793993319500054 | |
dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/8789 | |
dc.identifier | https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793993319500054 | |
dc.identifier | instname:Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano | |
dc.identifier | reponame:Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3495983 | |
dc.description.abstract | In order to suggest an appropriate regulatory regime in the context of firm asymmetry, this study
has developed a mathematical model that allows to elucidate comparisons of three different
regulatory scenarios. In the unregulated market, the low-cost firm is more likely to become
dominant in the market. Symmetric regulation has an immediate effect on off-net prices, which
fall to the level of its marginal costs. Finally, asymmetric regulation is a highly effective way of
promoting market entry. Asymmetric regulation can generate higher social welfare. | |
dc.publisher | Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.rights | Abierto (Texto Completo) | |
dc.subject | Asymmetric networks | |
dc.subject | Cargos de acceso | |
dc.title | Asymmetric networks and access charges | |