dc.date.accessioned2020-10-04T22:32:22Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-23T13:51:35Z
dc.date.available2020-10-04T22:32:22Z
dc.date.available2022-09-23T13:51:35Z
dc.date.created2020-10-04T22:32:22Z
dc.date.issued2013-05-20
dc.identifier0121-3628
dc.identifierhttp://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0121-36282013000200004&nrm=iso&tlng=pt
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10818/43515
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3471325
dc.description.abstractIn this text I argue in favor of considering the form (Eidos) as subject and therefore as responsible for the identity of the object through movement. I contemplate the priority of the form as substance, its particular character, and the different ways in which something can be a subject, this, in order to conclude why in Z, 3, form is the best candidate to be not only substance, but to be subject in a primary sense. The purpose of the text is to address the discussion as to why form, rather than matter or the composite, best fits the ontological criteria of being subject and the philosophical consequences of this position. As a corollary, I will make some comments on the dual ontology that Aristotle follows from Categories or Metaphysics.
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherEstud.filos
dc.relationEstud.filos. 2013, n.48, pp.49-72;
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad de La Sabana
dc.sourcereponame:Intellectum Repositorio Universidad de La Sabana
dc.subjectAristotle
dc.subjectSubject
dc.subjectSubstance (Ousia)
dc.subjectForm (Eidos)
dc.titleLa forma como sujeto: ¿un desliz de Aristóteles? Eidos como sujeto y garante de la identidad
dc.typearticle


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución