Tesis
Eficiencia en subastas de múltiples objetos
Autor
Kawamura, Enrique
Institución
Resumen
This research aims to systematize recent ndings about efficiency in multi-object auctions.
The main questions are: Is it possible to reach efficiency in multi-object auctions? How? What
factors affect efficiency, in theory and in practice? Several issues arise in the study of efficiency
in auctions. For example, results vary depending on players attitude toward risk, on whether
we assume private or common values, on whether objects are identical (which requires specify-
ing whether each player has unit-demand or multi-unit demand), or heterogeneous (assuming
players have de ned valuations for each possible package). A general point is that if one can
use observed bids to infer valuations, it is possible to reach e¢ ciency. For instance, it has been
shown that efficiency can be achieved in multi-object auctions when players have independent
private values and in common values settings with one-dimensional signals. This in general is
not true with common values and multidimensional signals. Finally, there is a growing litera-
ture about experiments with auctions, designed in order to compare auction formats in terms
of efficiency.