Artículos de revistas
Teoría de costos de transacción, formas de gobernación y los incentivos en Colombia : un estudio de caso
Fecha
2013-07-01Registro en:
01235923
Autor
Gorbaneff, Yuri
Cortés, Ariel
Torres, Sergio
Yepes, Francisco
Institución
Resumen
The paper examines the ability of the transaction cost theory to explain the incentives in the health chain.
A case study was conducted on CPS, a health insurer in Bogota. CPS moves in the environment of high
transaction costs, and uses the hybrid form of governance at outpatient level, which is according to the
theory. At hospital level, despite high uncertainty, the market is used as a form of governance, which makes
it difficult to relate payments to hospital performance. The paper concludes that the transaction costs
theory partially explains the configuration of incentives.