| dc.description.abstract | This master thesis analyses the interplay of political powers in Brazilian
Legislative chambers, during Lula s government. It considers the point of view of the
parties and the interests present on budget and fiscal disputes between Federal
Executive power and State Executive powers. It is considered that, as a representative
and supervisory institute, the Legislative chambers offer the possibility of politic
interactions between Executive power, governors and parties. The analysis follows eight
budget initiatives, being four of Crédito Extraordinário (Extraordinary Credit) and four
of Auxílio Financeiro (Financial Aid), made through Medidas Provisórias (Provisory
Measures) by the Executive power in benefit of States, towns and cities, after some
partial constitutional modifications, known as the Amendment n° 32, were
implemented.
After the identification of the gaps existing both in studies that stress the
centralization of legislative works and studies that emphasize the individual and
regional members of parliament s behavior, this study stresses the need for initiatives of
the Executive power that consider the tributary increase of other government instances.
It is argued that the Executive can, strategically, co-ordinate his initiatives with the
other government instances in an interactive way, to strengthen the Federal Government
and to promote modifications in the current model of fiscal exaction. The analysis of the
data shows that the Executive power, in spite of assuming the need for a reformulation
of the fiscal model, avoids the influence of the Legislative power, particularly that of the
Senate, driving bigger resources for Crédito Extraordinário, in detriment of Auxílio
Financeiro. It concludes that the difficulties found by the Executive power to approve a
new model of fiscal exaction in the Legislative chambers can be associated with little
influence of the government party (PT) on state governments. | |
