dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorLima, Rafael Coutinho Costa
dc.creatorMoreira, Humberto Ataíde
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-10T13:36:35Z
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-22T14:26:36Z
dc.date.available2018-05-10T13:36:35Z
dc.date.available2019-05-22T14:26:36Z
dc.date.created2018-05-10T13:36:35Z
dc.date.issued2014-07
dc.identifier0266-4658 / 1468-0327
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/23399
dc.identifier10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.010
dc.identifier000339130400019
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2694129
dc.description.abstractIn a seminal paper, Grossman and Helpman (1994) introduced a framework to understand how lobbying influences the choice of import/export tariffs. In this paper we extend their analysis and assume that lobbies have private information to analyze the effects of information transmission in a Grossman and Helpman lobby game. Information transmission leads to two agency costs. One refers to the cost of signaling and the other to the cost of screening the lobby's competitiveness. The signaling cost reduces distortions resulting from the screening cost. On the other hand, distortions from the screening cost enhance the signaling cost. The two combined effects generate more distortions in the political game than each effect separately. Tariff protection and lobbies' rents are lower than those found in Grossman and Helpman's truthful equilibrium. Therefore, information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of rent-seeking activities. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Science
dc.relationGames and economic behavior
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.sourceWeb of Science
dc.subjectLobby
dc.subjectAsymmetric information
dc.subjectCommon agency
dc.subjectPolitical economy
dc.titleInformation transmission and inefficient lobbying
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)


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