dc.contributorEscolas::EPGE
dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorBraido, Luís Henrique Bertolino
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-17T12:38:01Z
dc.date.available2014-11-17T12:38:01Z
dc.date.created2014-11-17T12:38:01Z
dc.date.issued2002-02-21
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/12450
dc.description.abstractEver since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
dc.relationSeminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGE
dc.rightsTodo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis
dc.subjectAgency theory
dc.subjectMoral hazard
dc.subjectTenancy data
dc.subjectSelection bias
dc.subjectEconometric test
dc.titleEvidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts
dc.typeWorking Paper


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