dc.contributorEscolas::EPGE
dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorCabral, Luis M. B.
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-20T13:37:33Z
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-22T14:16:48Z
dc.date.available2014-10-20T13:37:33Z
dc.date.available2019-05-22T14:16:48Z
dc.date.created2014-10-20T13:37:33Z
dc.date.issued1997-08-21
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/12160
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2692215
dc.description.abstractFrequently, aspiring entrants have only limited infonnation about their potential rivaIs' entry decisions. As a result, the outcome of the entry game may be that more firms enter than the market can sustain; or, at least, that unnecessary entry investments are made: entry mistakes may happen. We consider two models of non-coordinated entry. In these models, entry mistakes occur because of lags in observing rivaIs' entry decisions (grabthe- dollar entry) or because entry investments take time (war-of-attrition entry). The widebody aircraft industry in the late sixties is presented as supporting evidence for the models' assumptions. We also discuss the welfare implications of non-coordinated free entry. Both models predict that entry incentives are excessive (resp. insufficient) when duopoly profits are high (resp. low). However, if entry costs are high, entry incentives are excessive under war-of-attrition entry but insufficient under grab-the-dollar entry.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
dc.relationSeminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGE
dc.rightsTodo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis
dc.titleEntry mistakes happen!
dc.typeDocumentos de trabajo


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