Hybrid Auctions I: Theory

dc.contributorEscolas::EPGE
dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorMenezes, Flavio Marques
dc.creatorDutra, Joísa Campanher
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-13T15:23:36Z
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-23T18:57:49Z
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-22T14:03:47Z
dc.date.available2008-05-13T15:23:36Z
dc.date.available2010-09-23T18:57:49Z
dc.date.available2019-05-22T14:03:47Z
dc.date.created2008-05-13T15:23:36Z
dc.date.created2010-09-23T18:57:49Z
dc.date.issued2001-05-01
dc.identifier0104-8910
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/405
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2689678
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that combines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted it is declared the winner if her bid is higher than the second highest by more than a predetermined amount or percentage. If at least one more bidder submitted a bid su¢ciently close to the highest bid (that is, if the di¤erence between this bid and the highest bid is smaller than the predetermined amount or percentage) the quali…ed buyers compete in an open ascending auction that has the highest bid of the …rst stage as the reserve price. Quali…ed bidders include not only the highest bidder in the …rst stage but also those who bid close enough to her. We show that this auction generates more revenue than a standard auction. Although this hybrid auction does not generate as much revenue as the optimal auction, it is ex-post e¢cient.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
dc.relationEnsaios Econômicos;421
dc.subjectHybrid auctions
dc.subjectExpected revenue
dc.subjectEfficiency
dc.titleHybrid Auctions I: Theory
dc.typeDocumentos de trabajo


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución