Delegation, agenda control, and budget reform in Brazil, 1999-2008

dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorPraça, Sérgio
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-10T13:36:53Z
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-22T14:00:11Z
dc.date.available2018-05-10T13:36:53Z
dc.date.available2019-05-22T14:00:11Z
dc.date.created2018-05-10T13:36:53Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier0023-8791
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/23506
dc.identifier10.1353/lar.2015.0034
dc.identifier000363093500005
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2688972
dc.description.abstractHow are patterns of delegation between the president and the legislature chosen in multiparty presidential regimes? How do political actors make strategic use of legislative provisions during moments of institutional reform? This essay explores causal mechanisms related to these questions based on a case study of Brazilian budget reform from 1999 to 2008. The main findings are that legislative agenda control can be decisive for the maintenance of delegation patterns that favor governing coalitions; entrepreneurs have a real, but limited, power; and the strategic use of legislative rules may be as relevant for institutional reform as they are for regular policy making.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherLatin Amer Studies Assoc
dc.relationLatin american research review
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.sourceWeb of Science
dc.subjectPolicy-making
dc.subjectBehavior
dc.subjectPresidentialism
dc.subjectDemocracies
dc.titleDelegation, agenda control, and budget reform in Brazil, 1999-2008
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)


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