dc.contributorEscolas::EAESP
dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorLazzarini, Sérgio G.
dc.creatorMusacchio, Aldo
dc.creatorBandeira-de-Mello, Rodrigo
dc.creatorMarcon, Rosilene
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-25T18:24:00Z
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-22T13:53:14Z
dc.date.available2018-10-25T18:24:00Z
dc.date.available2019-05-22T13:53:14Z
dc.date.created2018-10-25T18:24:00Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier0305-750X
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/25432
dc.identifier10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.08.016
dc.identifier2-s2.0-84907760425
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2687657
dc.description.abstractDefendants of state-owned development banks emphasize their role in reducing capital constraints and fostering productive investment; detractors point out that they may benefit politically connected capitalists or bail out inefficient firms. We study the effect of loans and equity investments of the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) and find that they do not have any consistent effect on firm-level performance and investment, except for a reduction in financial expenditures due to the subsidies accompanying loans. However, BNDES does not systematically lend to underperforming firms. Our results indicate that BNDES subsidizes firms that could fund their projects with other sources of capital.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherElsevier Ltd
dc.relationWorld Development
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectBNDES
dc.subjectDevelopment banks
dc.subjectIndustrial policy
dc.subjectPolitical connections
dc.subjectState-owned banks
dc.subjectBanking
dc.subjectCapital formation
dc.subjectExpenditure
dc.subjectIndustrial performance
dc.subjectInvestment
dc.subjectLending behavior
dc.subjectState-owned enterprises
dc.subjectBrazil
dc.subjectBancos de desenvolvimento
dc.subjectPerformance industrial
dc.subjectEmpresas estatais
dc.titleWhat do state-owned development banks do? Evidence from BNDES, 2002-09
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)


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