Optimal insider strategy with law penalties

dc.contributorEscolas::EBAPE
dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorFajardo, José
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-25T18:23:10Z
dc.date.available2018-10-25T18:23:10Z
dc.date.created2018-10-25T18:23:10Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier0034-7140
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/25112
dc.identifier10.5935/0034-7140.20160002
dc.identifier2-s2.0-84963665008
dc.description.abstractWe study the optimal continuous trading strategy of an insider who is subject to the possibility of law penalties due to her illegal trading activity. Also, we discuss how to obtain the optimal penalty rule in order to maximize a welfare function.
dc.description.abstractEstudamos a estratégia contínua ótima de um insider que está sujeito as penalidades da lei devidas a suas atividades de negócios ilegais. Também, analisamos como obter a regra de penalidade ótima que maximize uma função de bem-estar.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherFundacao Getulio Vargas
dc.relationRevista Brasileira de Economia
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectInsider trading
dc.subjectLaw penalties
dc.subjectSocial welfare
dc.titleOptimal insider strategy with law penalties
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)


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