| dc.contributor | Escolas::EPGE | |
| dc.contributor | FGV | |
| dc.creator | Novaes, Walter | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-10-29T13:57:38Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-22T13:38:29Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-10-29T13:57:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-05-22T13:38:29Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2014-10-29T13:57:38Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1993-05-05 | |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/12273 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2684813 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper explaina why workers lack motivation near bankruptcy, why they tend to leave companies in financiai distreas, and why thoae who remam require higher compensation. Theae indirect costa of financiai diatresa adie becauae the optimal combination of debt and incentive achem.ea, deaigned to minimize agency costa, ends up underpaying managers when there ia a bankruptcy threat. The paper a1so providea new empirica1 implications on the intera.ction between financiai reatructuring and changea in managerial compensation. Theae predictions are supported by the findings of Gilson and Vetsuypens (1992). | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV | |
| dc.relation | Seminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGE | |
| dc.rights | Todo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis | |
| dc.title | Financial distress as a collapse of incentive scheme | |
| dc.type | Documentos de trabajo | |
