Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

dc.contributorEscolas::EPGE
dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorSotomayor, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-07T11:41:01Z
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-22T13:35:34Z
dc.date.available2014-11-07T11:41:01Z
dc.date.available2019-05-22T13:35:34Z
dc.date.created2014-11-07T11:41:01Z
dc.date.issued1999-09-09
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/12344
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2684244
dc.description.abstractWe consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
dc.relationSeminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGE
dc.rightsTodo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis
dc.subjectCompetitive price
dc.subjectNash equilibrium
dc.subjectMechanism
dc.subjectOptimal matching
dc.titleMarket clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands
dc.typeDocumentos de trabajo


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