dc.contributorEscolas::EPGE
dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorMaldonado, Wilfredo Fernando Leiva
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-25T10:31:51Z
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-22T13:28:59Z
dc.date.available2014-11-25T10:31:51Z
dc.date.available2019-05-22T13:28:59Z
dc.date.created2014-11-25T10:31:51Z
dc.date.issued2005-05-12
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/12582
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2683009
dc.description.abstractIn a two-period economy with incomplete markets and possibility of default we consider the two classical ways to enforce the honor of financial commitments: by using utility penalties and by using collateral requirements that borrowers have to fulfill. Firstly, we prove that any equilibrium in an economy with collateral requirements is also equilibrium in a non-collateralized economy where each agent is penalized (rewarded) in his utility if his delivery rate is lower (greater) than the payment rate of the financial market. Secondly, we prove the converse: any equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties is also equilibrium in a collateralized economy. For this to be true the payoff function and initial endowments of the agents must be modified in a quite natural way. Finally, we prove that the equilibrium in the economy with collateral requirements attains the same welfare as in the new economy with utility penalties.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
dc.relationSeminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGE
dc.rightsTodo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis
dc.subjectIncomplete markets
dc.subjectExogenous collateral
dc.subjectUtility penalties
dc.titleCollateral or utility penalties ?
dc.typeDocumentos de trabajo


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