Fiscal conservatism in a new democracy: 'sophisticated' versus 'naive' voters

dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorArvate, Paulo Roberto
dc.creatorAvelino Filho, George
dc.creatorTavares, Jose
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-10T13:35:45Z
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-22T13:28:15Z
dc.date.available2018-05-10T13:35:45Z
dc.date.available2019-05-22T13:28:15Z
dc.date.created2018-05-10T13:35:45Z
dc.date.issued2009-02
dc.identifier0957-8765 / 1573-7888
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/23121
dc.identifier10.1016/j.econlet.2008.11.030
dc.identifier000263707800019
dc.identifierTavares, Jose/0000-0002-8159-9646; Avelino F., George/0000-0001-8281-0194
dc.identifiernipe, cef/A-4218-2010; Arvate, Paulo/L-2009-2013
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2682862
dc.description.abstractWe use data from gubernatorial elections in Brazil to test the electoral reactions of 'sophisticated' and ''naive' voters to fiscal surpluses. Our results complement Brender and Drazen [Brender, Adi, and Drazen, A., (2005b), 'How do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects? Evidence from a large cross-section of countries', NBER Working Paper 11862, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts]: we find no evidence of fiscal illusion while, in some cases, a fiscal surplus may actually increase the probability of reelection. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherElsevier Science Sa
dc.relationEconomics letters
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.sourceWeb of Science
dc.subjectBudget deficits
dc.subjectElections
dc.subjectPolitical cycles
dc.subjectFiscal conservatism
dc.titleFiscal conservatism in a new democracy: 'sophisticated' versus 'naive' voters
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)


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