UM ESTUDO EMPÍRICO DOS CICLOS POLÍTICO-ECONÔMICOS NO BRASIL

dc.creatorPreussler, Athos Prates da Silveira
dc.creatorPortugal, Marcelo Savino
dc.date2009-10-09
dc.identifierhttps://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/AnaliseEconomica/article/view/10740
dc.descriptionThe political business cycle theory suggests that economic fluctuations can be explained by the electoral calendar. Knowing that economic performance has great influence in the electorate vote decision, the incumbent may try to manipulate the economy policy in order to maximize the chances of victory of the government candidate. Empirical studies that aimed to test this hypothesis have found evidence of political opportunism as much on macroeconomic variables as on the political economy instruments. The present paper has the objective to test the hypothesis of political opportunism on macroeconomic variables, on fiscal policy instruments and interest rates in Brazil between 1980 and 2000. The econometric tests we will use autoregressive integrated moved average models (ARIMA) with intercept dummy variables in the months that precede the elections. The results confirm the hypothesis of political opportunism in the inflation rate and in the total expenditure of the federal government.en-US
dc.descriptionThe political business cycle theory suggests that economic fluctuations can be explained by the electoral calendar. Knowing that economic performance has great influence in the electorate vote decision, the incumbent may try to manipulate the economy policy in order to maximize the chances of victory of the government candidate. Empirical studies that aimed to test this hypothesis have found evidence of political opportunism as much on macroeconomic variables as on the political economy instruments. The present paper has the objective to test the hypothesis of political opportunism on macroeconomic variables, on fiscal policy instruments and interest rates in Brazil between 1980 and 2000. The econometric tests we will use autoregressive integrated moved average models (ARIMA) with intercept dummy variables in the months that precede the elections. The results confirm the hypothesis of political opportunism in the inflation rate and in the total expenditure of the federal government.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagepor
dc.publisherUFRGSpt-BR
dc.relationhttps://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/AnaliseEconomica/article/view/10740/6354
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2019 Análise Econômicapt-BR
dc.sourceAnálise Econômica; Vol. 21 No. 40 (2003): setembro de 2003en-US
dc.sourceAnálise Econômica; v. 21 n. 40 (2003): setembro de 2003pt-BR
dc.source2176-5456
dc.source0102-9924
dc.subjectPolitical business cycle. Political economy. Economic policy.pt-BR
dc.subjectJEL Classificationpt-BR
dc.subjectE60pt-BR
dc.subjectPolitical business cycle. Political economy. Economic policy.en-US
dc.subjectJEL Classificationen-US
dc.subjectE60en-US
dc.titleUM ESTUDO EMPÍRICO DOS CICLOS POLÍTICO-ECONÔMICOS NO BRASILen-US
dc.titleUM ESTUDO EMPÍRICO DOS CICLOS POLÍTICO-ECONÔMICOS NO BRASILpt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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