dc.creator | Beade, Ileana Paola | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-06-12T22:17:11Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-06T14:31:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-06-12T22:17:11Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-11-06T14:31:54Z | |
dc.date.created | 2018-06-12T22:17:11Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-12 | |
dc.identifier | Beade, Ileana Paola; The thing in-itself and its role in the constitution of objectivity: A critical reading of Onof´s reconstruction of transcendental affection; Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani; Studi Kantiani; xxvi; 12-2013; 110-135 | |
dc.identifier | 1123-4938 | |
dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/48481 | |
dc.identifier | 1724-1812 | |
dc.identifier | CONICET Digital | |
dc.identifier | CONICET | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/1887403 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper I consider some conclusions drawn by Christian Onof in a recent paper, in which the author analyzes the problem of transcendental affection. Onof assumes that Kant´s references to the thing-in-itself as the cause (or ground) of sensible affection reveal a commitment to a metaphysical assumption, that is: the existence of something real beyond the subject's mind. I will suggest, on the contrary, that Kant´s confidence in the existence of a non-subjective reality should not be characterized as a metaphysical but as a pre-philosophical assumption, that is: an unproblematic starting point for the critical investigation which Kant did not consider as demanding any particular justification. In the second place, I will try to show that affection should not be characterized (as Onof suggests) as a transcendental condition of the constitution of objectivity, but rather as a transcendent condition (directly related to sensations, which provide the matter of appearances). Finally, I will try to demonstrate that the two-aspects interpretation (which Onof explicitly rejects) is compatible with the conception of the thing-in-itself as the unknown cause or ground of appearances, since it is possible to articulate such conception with the thesis that affirms that the thing-in-itself is nothing ontologically different from the empirical object given in experience. | |
dc.language | eng | |
dc.publisher | Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani | |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/https://dx.doi.org/10.1400/219492 | |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.torrossa.com/resources/an/2941071 | |
dc.rights | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess | |
dc.subject | THING-IN-ITSELF | |
dc.subject | OBJECTIVITY | |
dc.subject | TRANSCENDENTAL AFFECTION | |
dc.subject | TRANSCENDENTAL CONDITIONS | |
dc.title | The thing in-itself and its role in the constitution of objectivity: A critical reading of Onof´s reconstruction of transcendental affection | |
dc.type | Artículos de revistas | |
dc.type | Artículos de revistas | |
dc.type | Artículos de revistas | |