Artículos de revistas
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
Fecha
2016-05Registro en:
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability; Society for Economic Theory; Theoretical Economics; 11; 2; 5-2016; 547-586
1933-6837
CONICET Digital
CONICET
Autor
Arribillaga, Roberto Pablo
Jordi, Massó Carreras
Resumen
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes: the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.