dc.creatorKalpokas, Daniel Enrique
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-10T19:58:20Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-06T13:33:49Z
dc.date.available2018-01-10T19:58:20Z
dc.date.available2018-11-06T13:33:49Z
dc.date.created2018-01-10T19:58:20Z
dc.date.issued2014-12
dc.identifierThe Experience Not Well Lost; Brill Academic Publishers; Contemporary Pragmatism; 11; 1; 12-2014; 43-56
dc.identifier1572-3429
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/32896
dc.identifier1875-8185
dc.identifierCONICET Digital
dc.identifierCONICET
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/1876861
dc.description.abstractAccording to Rorty, we can avoid the typical problems of traditional epistemology if we do not posit epistemological intermediaries between mind and world in order to explain empirical knowledge. In particular, one can do that if one considers perceptual experiences, not as mental states with representational content, but as causes of empirical beliefs. Accordingly, Rorty rejects any justificatory relation between experience and belief. Only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Experience has only a causal role in the acquisition of an empirical belief. In this article, I show how Rorty's resistance to attribute representational content to perceptual experience conspires against his attempt to overcome Cartesian epistemology.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherBrill Academic Publishers
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/18758185-90000275
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-90000275
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.subjectRORTY
dc.subjectPERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE
dc.subjectEPISTEMOLOGY
dc.titleThe Experience Not Well Lost
dc.typeArtículos de revistas
dc.typeArtículos de revistas
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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