dc.creatorMachuca, Diego Emanuel
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-19T20:13:28Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-06T13:25:11Z
dc.date.available2018-07-19T20:13:28Z
dc.date.available2018-11-06T13:25:11Z
dc.date.created2018-07-19T20:13:28Z
dc.date.issued2015-06
dc.identifierMachuca, Diego Emanuel; Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Analytic Philosophy; 56; 2; 6-2015; 177-187
dc.identifier2153-9596
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/52708
dc.identifierCONICET Digital
dc.identifierCONICET
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/1875175
dc.description.abstractIt is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes "to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief on a certain issue even if one´s current evidence is not neutral (or even close to neutral)". My aim in this paper is to point to a number of problems in Wieland´s position, some of which in connection with the account of Pyrrhonian skepticism found in the extant works of Sextus Empiricus.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherWiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phib.12060
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phib.12060
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.subjectSKEPTICISM
dc.subjectSUSPENSION
dc.subjectEQUIPOLLENCE
dc.subjectINQUIRY
dc.titleSuspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland
dc.typeArtículos de revistas
dc.typeArtículos de revistas
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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