Artículos de revistas
¿Autorización perceptiva?
Fecha
2014-12Registro en:
¿Autorización perceptiva?; Universidad de Oviedo; Teorema; XXXIII; 1; 12-2014; 19-37
0210-1602
CONICET Digital
CONICET
Autor
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
Resumen
This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for its beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject´s rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined.