Artículos de revistas
Belief revision in structured probabilistic argumentation: Model and application to cyber security
Fecha
2016-12Registro en:
Shakarian, Paulo; Simari, Gerardo; Moores, Geoffrey; Paulo, Damon; Parsons, Simon; et al.; Belief revision in structured probabilistic argumentation: Model and application to cyber security; Springer; Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence; 78; 3-4; 12-2016; 259-301
1012-2443
CONICET Digital
CONICET
Autor
Shakarian, Paulo
Simari, Gerardo
Moores, Geoffrey
Paulo, Damon
Parsons, Simon
Falappa, Marcelo Alejandro
Aleali, Ashkan
Resumen
In real-world applications, knowledge bases consisting of all the available information for a specific domain, along with the current state of affairs, will typically contain contradictory data, coming from different sources, as well as data with varying degrees of uncertainty attached. An important aspect of the effort associated with maintaining such knowledge bases is deciding what information is no longer useful; pieces of information may be outdated; may come from sources that have recently been discovered to be of low quality; or abundant evidence may be available that contradicts them. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic structured argumentation framework that arises from the extension of Presumptive Defeasible Logic Programming (PreDeLP) with probabilistic models, and argue that this formalism is capable of addressing these basic issues. The formalism is capable of handling contradictory and uncertain data, and we study non-prioritized belief revision over probabilistic PreDeLP programs that can help with knowledge-base maintenance. For belief revision, we propose a set of rationality postulates — based on well-known ones developed for classical knowledge bases — that characterize how these belief revision operations should behave, and study classes of operators along with theoretical relationships with the proposed postulates, including representation theorems stating the equivalence between classes of operators and their associated postulates. We then demonstrate how our framework can be used to address the attribution problem in cyber security/cyber warfare.