dc.creatorMoguillansky, Martin O.
dc.creatorWassermann, Renata
dc.creatorFalappa, Marcelo A.
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-25T12:10:56Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-04T16:01:28Z
dc.date.available2013-10-25T12:10:56Z
dc.date.available2018-07-04T16:01:28Z
dc.date.created2013-10-25T12:10:56Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifierLOGIC JOURNAL OF THE IGPL, OXFORD, v. 20, n. 1, supl. 1, Part 1, pp. 154-186, FEB, 2012
dc.identifier1367-0751
dc.identifierhttp://www.producao.usp.br/handle/BDPI/36053
dc.identifier10.1093/jigpal/jzr029
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzr029
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/1630596
dc.description.abstractReasoning and change over inconsistent knowledge bases (KBs) is of utmost relevance in areas like medicine and law. Argumentation may bring the possibility to cope with both problems. Firstly, by constructing an argumentation framework (AF) from the inconsistent KB, we can decide whether to accept or reject a certain claim through the interplay among arguments and counterarguments. Secondly, by handling dynamics of arguments of the AF, we might deal with the dynamics of knowledge of the underlying inconsistent KB. Dynamics of arguments has recently attracted attention and although some approaches have been proposed, a full axiomatization within the theory of belief revision was still missing. A revision arises when we want the argumentation semantics to accept an argument. Argument Theory Change (ATC) encloses the revision operators that modify the AF by analyzing dialectical trees-arguments as nodes and attacks as edges-as the adopted argumentation semantics. In this article, we present a simple approach to ATC based on propositional KBs. This allows to manage change of inconsistent KBs by relying upon classical belief revision, although contrary to it, consistency restoration of the KB is avoided. Subsequently, a set of rationality postulates adapted to argumentation is given, and finally, the proposed model of change is related to the postulates through the corresponding representation theorem. Though we focus on propositional logic, the results can be easily extended to more expressive formalisms such as first-order logic and description logics, to handle evolution of ontologies.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherOXFORD UNIV PRESS
dc.publisherOXFORD
dc.relationLOGIC JOURNAL OF THE IGPL
dc.rightsCopyright OXFORD UNIV PRESS
dc.rightsclosedAccess
dc.subjectKNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION AND REASONING
dc.subjectARGUMENTATION
dc.subjectBELIEF BASE REVISION
dc.subjectARGUMENTATION DYNAMICS
dc.subjectREASONING OVER INCONSISTENCY
dc.titleInconsistent-tolerant base revision through Argument Theory Change
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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